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NOTE 
WAGERING ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
INTRODUCTION 
Oliver Wendell Holmes once declared, "[t]he first requirement of a 
sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings 
and demands of the community, whether right or wrong. "1 At the 
opening of the twenty-first century, the constitutional protection of re-
ligious liberty seems anemic at best. 2 If, as Holmes suggests, the cur-
rent jurisprudence stems from the "actual feelings ... of the commu-
nity,"3 then a more robust protection for religion will require more 
than sophisticated doctrinal analysis. Referring to the concept of lib-
erty generally, Friedrich A. Hayek wrote: 
If old truths are to retain their hold on men's minds, they must be restated 
in the language and concepts of successive generations. What at one time 
are their most effective expressions gradually become so worn with use 
that they cease to carry a definite meaning. The underlying ideas may be 
as valid as ever, but the words, even when they refer to problems that are 
still with us, no longer convey the same conviction.4 
Something like this seems to have happened to the concept of religious 
freedom. The old justifications for religious liberty no longer have the 
force that they once did, and our current discourse has yet to find a 
plausible way of defending religious liberty in terms that "convey the 
same conviction."s 
This Note is concerned with the government's punishment of relig-
iously motivated behavior. People routinely act in particular ways be-
cause of their religious beliefs. Often the government punishes that 
behavior. The most basic question of religious liberty is whether reli-
gious behavior in conflict with the law should be punished or whether 
there is some justification for giving religion special protection. The 
answer that we give to this question may be important to constitu-
tional doctrine. However, it also has implications for how legislatures 
1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (Mark Dewolfe Howe ed., Back 
Bay Books I963) (I88I). 
2 See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology 
to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. I, 36 (2ooo) ("Under the Free Exer-
cise Clause, the impact of [the Supreme Court's current emphasis on] formal neutrality is clearly 
detrimental, because it limits the protection of religiously motivated conduct." (citations omit-
ted)); see also infra Part I. 
3 HOLMES, supra note I, at 36. 
4 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY I (I960). 
5 /d. 
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write laws. When drafting statutes, should a legislature choose to ex-
empt the religious practices of its citizens from otherwise general regu-
lations? This is a question of religious liberty that is related to but 
nevertheless different from questions of constitutional doctrine. Thus, 
while much has been written about the legitimacy of using religion in 
policy debates6 and the intricacies of the free exercise doctrine, 7 this 
Note addresses the simpler and rawer question of why a liberal state 
would want to protect religious conduct. 
This Note will try to identify the problem with current thinking 
about religious liberty, trace its origins, and offer a possible justifica-
tion for religious freedom based on the thought of the seventeenth-
century French philosopher Blaise Pascal. Part I sketches the source 
of the current problem with the concept of religious freedom. Part II 
lays out Pascal's wager and uses it as an analogy for an argument in 
favor of religious freedom. Finally, Part III seeks to respond to the 
most powerful objection to the argument in Part II. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF (THE INCOHERENCE OF) RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY 
Finding origins is always a tricky business, but in the American 
experience, religious liberty emerged as a key theme from the very be-
ginning. As early as 1620, religious liberty appeared as a central ques-
tion in the founding of the Plymouth Plantation by English separatists 
seeking refuge from English laws aimed at dissenters.8 Later in the 
century, Roger Williams dissented from the orthodoxy of Massachu-
setts's congregationalism and founded the colony of Rhode Island.9 
Several decades after Williams, Lord Baltimore founded the colony of 
Maryland at least in part to provide a refuge for English Catholics. 10 
A similar impetus lay behind William Penn's creation of the Quaker 
colony of Pennsylvania. 11 In all of these cases, the primary arguments 
6 Compare JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212-54 (1996) (discussing the idea of 
public reason), and BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 28o-82 
(1980) (arguing that religious arguments may not legitimately be used in public debates), with 
RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA (2d ed. 1984) (arguing that religion has a legitimate place in public discussion), and 
Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay on Legal Theory, in 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 25, 38-43 (Michael W. McConnell et a!. 
eds., 2001) (responding to Ackerman's arguments). 
7 See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (2002). 
8 See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 50 (1998). 
9 See id. at 54· 
ro See id. 
II See id. 
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in favor of what religious freedom there was were explicitly theologi-
cal. The Puritans, Williams, Baltimore, and Penn were all motivated 
by their own distinct readings of the Christian gospel. 
John Locke's influential Letter Concerning Toleration 12 provides an 
example of these theologically based justifications for religious free-
dom. His letter is illuminating for two reasons. First, Locke influ-
enced later American thought. Second, his letter neatly illustrates the 
explicitly Christian context of early arguments for religious freedom. 
"I esteem [the mutual Toleration of Christians] to be the chief Charac-
teristical Mark of the True Church," he wrote. 13 Locke argued on the 
basis of the New Testament that true Christianity could not justify co-
ercion of religious belief. Rebuking those who persecute others in the 
name of religious truth, he explicitly appealed to the example of Jesus: 
If, like the Captain of our Salvation, they sincerely desired the Good of 
Souls, they would tread in the Steps, and follow the perfect Example of 
that Prince of Peace, who sent out his Soldiers to the subduing of Nations, 
and gathering them into his Church, not armed with the Sword, or other 
Instruments of Force, but prepared with the Gospel of Peace, and with the 
Exemplary Holiness of their Conversation. 14 
Locke went on to affirm that voluntary belief is superior to forced be-
lief and, furthermore, is a condition of salvation. Religion, he argued, 
cannot "be available to the Salvation of Souls unless [it] be thoroughly 
believed . . . . But Penalties are in no ways capable to produce such 
Belief."15 
Arguments remarkably similar to those advanced by Locke became 
the foundation for religious freedom in the early United States. 
"Whether or not embodied in the First Amendment as originally un-
derstood, the substantive idea of religious liberty was firmly rooted in 
the founding period, and it was firmly rooted not in secular philoso-
phy, but rather in theology. "16 For example, in a I 7 77 draft of A Bill 
for Establishing Religious Freedom, Thomas Jefferson justified the 
concept of religious freedom with reference to "the plan of the holy au-
thor of our religion"17 and attacked the "impious presumption of legis-
lators and rulers ... [who] hath established and maintained false relig-
ions over the greater part of the world and through all time. "18 The 
arguments offered were not only profoundly religious, but also tied to 
12 JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION Games H. Thlly ed., Hackett 
Publ'g Co. 1983) (1689). 
I3 /d. at 23. 
14 /d. at 25. 
IS /d. at 27. 
16 Conkle, supra note 2, at 3. 
17 Thomas Jefierson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1777), reprinted in THOMAS 
}EFFERSON, WRITINGS 346 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
18 /d. 
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a certain brand of voluntaristic Protestantism manifested in America 
by sects such as the Baptists and the Mennonites. 19 
These theological justifications for the paramount value of religious 
freedom were rhetorically powerful because they were able to draw on 
Christianity's assessment of its own value. In short, they provided a 
coherent theory of why we should protect religion qua religion: false 
religion is marked by religious coercion; true religion is marked by re-
ligious voluntarism. Religious freedom is thus a way of avoiding impi-
ety Gefferson) and following Jesus to salvation (Locke). 
For a variety of reasons, the Christian arguments advanced in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are no longer ade-
quate. First, they provided (Protestant) Christianity with a privileged 
position that decisively excluded unorthodox faiths. For example, dur-
ing the mid- and late nineteenth century, when such arguments con-
tinued to hold sway, the Mormons were nevertheless subject to mas-
sive and brutal persecution by state authorities20 and the federal 
government2 1 precisely because they deviated from the Protestant 
norm. 22 Furthermore, regardless of one's position on the intricate de-
bates over the role of public reason and the legitimacy of professions of 
faith in public discussion/3 appeals to a particular form of Protestant-
ism are unlikely to gain broad support in a pluralistic society. 24 Fi-
nally, such overtly theological justifications for state action seem to go 
beyond simply protecting (some) religious believers. To modern ears 
19 Cf Steven D. Smith, Blooming Confusion: Madison's Mixed Legacy, 75 IND. L.J. 6r, 66 
(2ooo) ("We might roughly describe the religious beliefs in which Madison's argument was 
grounded as theistic - and not merely theistic but Christian, and not merely Christian but Prot-
estant, and not merely Protestant but reflective of a sort of nonstatist, voluntaristic Protestantism 
akin to that of the Baptists whom Madison had earlier defended against persecution and who 
later provided the votes to elect Madison to Congress.") 
20 In 1838, after several months of y•olence and unrest, Governor Lilburn Boggs of Missouri 
issued an extermination order against the Mormons. "The Mormons must be treated as enemies," 
he ordered the state militia, "and must be exterminated, or driven from the State if necessary for 
the public peace." AMONG THE MORMONS 103 (William Mulder & A. Russell Mortensen eds., 
1958). 
21 See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002) (recounting 
the legal battles between the Mormon church and the federal government over the practice of po-
lygamy). According to one account of the period, "the legal war waged over polygamy was one of 
the titanic ... struggles of American legal history." Nathan B. Oman, Note, The Story of a For-
gotten Battle, 2002 BYU L. REV. 745, 746. 
22 See Oman, supra note 2 r, at 745 (noting that nineteenth-century anti-polygamists justified 
punishing the Mormons in part because "Mormonism was not really a religion"). 
23 See sources cited supra note 6. 
24 Nevertheless, the force of such arguments in the United States, where Protestantism re-
mains a major religion and where many citizens are religiously active, should not be underesti-
mated. Cf William Stuntz, Christian Legal Thought, n6 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2003) 
(noting that, despite the secularization of the legal academy, many Americans subscribe to some 
version of Protestant Christianity). 
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they seem to create an official theology, albeit a tolerant one in the 
model of the early Baptists. 
Yet, shorn of their ability to appeal to religious self-understanding, 
modern justifications for religious liberty have been largely unsuccess-
ful at explaining why religiously motivated behavior deserves protec-
tion. Appeals to the "plain meaning" of the text of the Constitution 
have failed to gain the support of textualists on the Supreme Court.25 
Some commentators have argued that religious freedom is necessary to 
create a "secular public realm," but fail to explain why such a realm is 
inconsistent with neutral, generally applicable laws that criminalize re-
ligious sacraments. 26 Others have suggested that religion is valuable 
because it serves to inculcate virtue, 27 but such a justification is 
unlikely to protect unorthodox religions whose practices are labeled 
immoral by democratic majorities. Yet such unorthodox minorities are 
precisely the religious groups that the state is most likely to target.28 
Finally, some, building on the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, reason 
that religion should be protected because it provides the social capital 
necessary to overcome the atomizing force of liberal individualism. 29 
But political scientists have argued persuasively that such communal 
glue can be provided equally well by bowling leagues and social 
clubs.30 
Ultimately, current justifications of religious freedom fail because 
they do not take religion seriously on its own terms. No Muslim be-
lieves that he should make a pilgrimage to Mecca to raise the general 
level of civic virtue. He does it because his faith that there is no God 
but Allah and that Mohammed is his Prophet teaches that only by 
completing the hadj can he qualify for entry into paradise.31 Likewise, 
25 Compare Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
313, 314 (1996) ("For whatever reason, the Constitution does give special protection to liberty in 
the domain of religion, and we cannot repudiate that decision without rejecting an essential fea-
ture of constitutionalism."), with Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (Scalia, J.) 
(rejecting the claim that the text of the Free Exercise Clause requires states to exempt religiously 
motivated conduct from generally applicable, neutral laws). 
26 See Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE 
MODERN STATE 195 (Geoffrey R. Stone eta!. eds., 1992). 
27 See generally RICHARD VETTERLI & GARY BRYNER, IN SEARCH OF THE REPUBLIC: 
PUBLIC VIRTUE AND THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987) (describing the im-
portance of religion as a guarantor of civic virtue in the thought of the founders). 
28 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
(striking down a law punishing religiously motivated animal sacrifice); Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding the criminalization of religiously practiced polygamy). 
29 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 35-43 (rev. ed. 1994). 
30 See generally ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000) (discussing "social capital" as a 
necessary element of democratic society and the ways in which it is formed in voluntary associa-
tions). 
31 As one scholar of Islamic jurisprudence has written: 
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Orthodox Jews are not interested in creating mediating institutions but 
in faithfully fulfilling the conditions of the covenant God made with 
Moses and Israel on Mount Sinai.32 Buddhist temples are not factories 
for the production of social capital but places where people attempt to 
follow the example of Buddha to nirvana. 33 Christian churches are 
not components of some philosophy of the "secular public realm" but 
meetings of "fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of 
God"34 seeking salvation through Jesus Christ the Son of God. In 
short, the current arguments generally offered in favor of religious lib-
erty have nothing to do with the ultimate concerns that are at the 
heart of religious belief. They simply do not take such concerns seri-
ously. 
The Supreme Court's leading Free Exercise cases from the 1990s 
illustrate how this problem is played out. Employment Division v. 
Smith35 concerned an Oregon law that criminalized the use of peyote, a 
drug made from cactus plants. The Native American Church, how-
ever, uses peyote as a sacrament.36 Two members of the church em-
ployed as drug counselors were dismissed from their jobs because of 
peyote useY When they applied for unemployment benefits, the state 
denied their claims on the ground that they were terminated for 
"work-related misconduct."38 They sued, arguing that the Oregon law 
violated their right to the free exercise of religion under the First 
Amendment.39 In the words of the Supreme Court's majority opinion, 
the discharged members of the Native American Church claimed "that 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion includes requiring any individ-
ual to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the 
While political legislation considers social problems in terms of the effects of an individ-
ual's behaviour upon his neighbour or upon the community as a whole, a religious law 
looks beyond this to the effect that actions may have upon the conscience and eternal 
soul of the one who performs them. In short, the primary purpose of the Qur'an is to 
regulate not the relationship of man with his fellows but his relationship with his Crea-
tor. 
N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW I2 (Edinburgh Univ. Press 200I) (I964). 
32 See MENDELL LEWITTES, JEWISH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION II (I987) ("The corner-
stone of traditional Judaism, more particularly Rabbinic or Halakhic Judaism, is its faith in the 
revelation of God's word to Israel at Sinai as recorded in the Pentateuch."). 
33 See Michael W. Meister & Nancy Steinhardt, Buddhist Temple Compounds, in I4 THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 373-80 (Mircea Eliade ed., I987) (discussing the history andre-
ligious significance of Buddhist temples). 
34 Ephesians 2:I9. 
35 494 U.S. 872 (I990). 
36 0MER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY (I990) (discussing the religious im-
portance of peyote). 
37 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
38 /d. 
39 /d. 
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performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires)."40 
Smith thus presented the fundamental question whether religious be-
lievers are entitled to engage in illegal activity because it is religiously 
required. 
The Court ruled that religious believers were not entitled to such 
freedom. 41 In so doing the majority emphasized that the prohibition at 
issue was "a valid and neutral law of general applicability."42 Halting 
the operation of the law in the case of religious conduct, the Court 
warned, "would be courting anarchy."43 Such an exemption would 
"make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon 
the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, ... permitting him, by 
virtue of his beliefs, to become a law unto himself."44 
A few years later, the Court considered whether the subordination 
of religious conduct to the demands of law set out in Smith was abso-
lute. In Smith, the Court had suggested that a law targeting a particu-
lar practice because it was religiously motivated might run afoul of the 
Free Exercise Clause. 45 In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah,46 the Court squarely addressed this issue. The Florida 
town of Hialeah passed an ordinance forbidding the killing of animals 
in religious ritualsY The law was aimed at the ritual sacrifices of the 
Santeria religion that is common among Florida's Caribbean immi-
grant population.48 Faced with a law singling out a particular group of 
religious believers, the Court ruled decisively that the law violated the 
Constitution's guarantee of "free exercise of religion."49 As opposed to 
the cold shoulder given to the members of the Native American 
Church in Smith, the City of Hialeah Court wrote, "[t]he principle that 
government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective 
manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief 
40 !d. at 878 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41 !d. 
42 !d. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in the judgment)). 
43 I d. at 888. 
44 !d. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
45 See id at 87i. 
It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a State 
would be prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] if it sought to ban such acts or absten-
tions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious 
belief that they display. 
!d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
46 508 u.s. 520 (1993). 
4 i !d. at 527. 
48 !d. at 524-27. 
49 !d. at 524. 
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is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exer-
cise Clause."50 
Ironically, the concept of religious freedom articulated in the 
Smith-City of Hialeah duet in no way provides any unique liberty for 
religious conduct. With these cases the Free Exercise Clause was, in 
effect, transformed into a subspecies of equal protection. The opinions 
conceptualize religious liberty entirely in terms of equality and dis-
crimination. The focus is not on the religious believer but on the gov-
ernment. It is a question whether the government is using an imper-
missible classification in creating its laws. Religion becomes a "suspect 
classification" akin to race51 or - to a lesser extent - gender,52 
triggering a stricter level of judicial scrutiny. 53 The believer, in 
contrast, occupies a secondary place in the analysis. There is a sense 
in which the facts of the cases are identical from the point of view of 
the believers: both are faced with a choice between obeying God and 
obeying Caesar,54 because a person punished by a neutral law is just as 
punished as a person who is targeted. 
The Court's failure to protect religious conduct as religious conduct 
is part of the wider problem of justifying religious freedom. Writing 
for the Court in Smith, Justice Scalia reasoned that "a society that be-
lieves in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be ex-
pected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well."55 The 
clear implication is that legislatures can carve out protection for relig-
iously motivated conduct if they wish.56 However, both robust protec-
tion for religious conduct under the Free Exercise Clause and the kind 
of legislative protections envisioned by Justice Scalia require some jus-
tification for protecting religious conduct qua religious conduct. What 
is needed is an answer to the question of "[w]hy is it a good thing, for 
us Americans ... that government may [not] prohibit the free exercise 
of religion. "57 
50 /d. at S43· 
5! See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200, 227 (I99S) (holding that racial 
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny). 
5Z See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, SI8 U.S. SIS, S3I-34 (I99S) (applying heightened scru-
tiny to gender classifications). 
53 Cf LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-2 to -6, at 1439-S4 
(2d ed. 1988) (discussing various levels of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause). 
54 Cf Matthew 22:1s-22. 
55 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
56 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of legislative exemp-
tions for religious conduct. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding the exemption of religious organiza-
tions from federal antidiscrimination laws); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) {upholding 
tax exemptions for churches). 
57 Michael]. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de Siecle Sketches, 75 IND. 
L.J. 29S, 296 (2000). 
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Among some proponents of religious freedom there seems to be a 
deep pessimism about whether we can answer this question. For ex-
ample, one commentator has argued: 
[V]arious justifications for [giving special protection to religion] are no 
longer plausible, and thus can no longer account for religious exemptions. 
In the face of increasing scrutiny and growing criticism, these justifica-
tions no longer persuasively explain why religious people are constitution-
ally entitled to exemptions from laws that burden their religious practices, 
but non-religious people are not .... 58 
Others have articulated a similarly bleak picture of the contempo-
rary prospects for justifying religious freedom: "[T]here is something 
approaching unanimity on the proposition that the prevailing dis-
course of religious freedom - or the official framework and language 
within which issues of religious freedom are argued and judicially re-
solved- is deeply incoherent."59 Professor Steven Smith demonstrates 
this idea with a thought experiment. Imagine a polity in which the 
spiritual dominates the temporal and theological arguments are used to 
justify the privileged place of religion. Such a polity would be what 
"we would call ... a 'theocracy.' And we are accustomed to treating 
'theocracy' not as a version of, but rather as the antithesis of, 'reli-
gious freedom. '"60 At the other extreme, in a polity in which the tem-
poral is decisively superior to the spiritual, it may be possible to pro-
vide protection for religious conduct under the rubric of things like 
"free speech" or "equality," but "the purified temporal community 
would not now claim to have, or to operate according to, any 'theory 
of religious freedom. "'61 "[N]either perspective actually recognizes the 
value of 'religious freedom' in a meaningful sense. That value is asso-
ciated, rather, with a dualist position - one that regards both the 
spiritual and the temporal as independently valuable."62 Such a dual-
ist position cannot provide a coherent account of when the spiritual 
subordinates the temporal or vice-versa.63 
58 Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Reli-
gious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 556 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
59 Smith, supra note 19, at 6r. 
60 Steven D. Smith, Is a Coherent Theory of Religious Freedom Possible?, rs CONST. 
COMMENT. 7J, 78 (1998). 
61 /d. at 8r. 
62 /d. at 82. 
63 According to Professor Smith: 
Since both the spiritual and the temporal make a claim, any solution will necessarily re-
ject one of those claims by giving primacy to the competing perspective. 
And precisely because it recognizes that the spiritual and the temporal are both 
valuable, and that they are independently valuable (as opposed to one being derived 
from or a subset of the other), dualism cannot dictate which perspective should prevail. 
If the spiritual and the temporal are both real and autonomous, in other words, then 
there is no more encompassing principle to which they are both subordinate. 
/d. at 84. 
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II. WAGERING ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
We do not seem to have a theory that allows the state to take the 
concerns of religion seriously without creating the kind of state-
sponsored orthodoxy that renders the original theological justifications 
for religious liberty problematic. However, the seventeenth-century 
French philosopher Blaise Pascal may provide a model of how we 
might do so. Pascal reasoned that, for a rational agnostic, faith in God 
is the best option, even in the face of religious uncertainty. If the state 
is truly agnostic, it can neither affirm nor reject the truth claims of re-
ligion. However, like Pascal's rational agnostic, it can still reason 
probabilistically about the value of religion. Such reasoning suggests 
that religiously motivated behavior should be entitled to special protec-
tion after all. 
A. l'ascal~ ~ager 
Pascal has never fit comfortably into the theological and philoso-
phical tradition of which he is a part. His own career illustrates some-
thing of the tension inherent in his thought. Pascal was a brilliant 
mathematician whose precise and technological mind produced the 
first programmable computer, which used mechanical gears to com-
pute equations. 64 At the same time, he was a religious mystic passion-
ately devoted to Christianity and deeply skeptical of the powers of 
human reason.65 Upon his death, it was discovered that for most of 
his adult life he wore a talisman next to his skin containing the 
parchment upon which he had recorded his conversion to Christianity 
on the night of a mystical religious experience.66 Like his life, Pascal's 
thought is an amalgamation of scientific rationalism and religious mys-
ticism that has defied easy classification through the centuries. 
Pascal's famous wager argument illustrates this synchronism, cou-
pling the hope of eternal bliss with mathematical calculations. During 
the final years of his life, Pascal began work on an apology for Christi-
anity.67 He never completed the book, but after his death his notes 
were arranged and published as the l'ensees.68 His famous wager ap-
pears in these posthumously published notes. Pascal stated the core of 
his argument in a few simple sentences: 
You must either believe or not believe that God is - which will you do? 
Your human reason cannot say. A game is going on between you and the 
nature of things which at the day of judgment will bring out either heads 
64 See MARVIN R. O'CONNELL, BLAISE PASCAL: REASONS OF THE HEART 26 (1997). 
65 See id. at 152. 
66 See id. at 95. 
67 See id. at 155. 
68 See id. 
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or tails. Weigh what your gains and your losses would be if you should 
stake all you have on heads, or God's existence: if you win in such case, 
you gain eternal beatitude; if you lose, you lose nothing at all. If there 
were an infinity of chances, and only one for God in this wager, still you 
ought to stake your all on God; for though you surely risk a finite loss by 
this procedure, any finite loss is reasonable, even a certain one is reason-
able, if there is but the possibility of infinite gain. Go, then, and take holy 
water, and have masses said; belief will come and stupefy your scruples 
.... Why should you not? At bottom, what have you to lose?69 
Pascal's wager has had more than its share of detractors over the 
years. 70 One scholar has noted that "philosophers feel it somehow as a 
professional obligation not to accept [the wager's] cogency."71 The ob-
jections have generally taken one of two forms. First, there are those 
who object to the (supposedly) implicit premise of the argument that 
one can choose whether to believe in God. One philosopher articu-
lated this criticism, writing: 
Does it not seem preposterous on the very face of it to talk of our opinions 
being modifiable at will? Can our will either help or hinder our intellect 
in its perceptions of truth? Can we, by just willing it, believe that Abra-
ham Lincoln's existence is a myth . . . . We can say any of these things, 
but we are absolutely impotent to believe them .... 72 
The second criticism is that the wager implicitly assumes that the 
only possibilities are atheism or a God that would reward the wagerer. 
However, as one critic puts it, "[f]or all we know God may be reserving 
a special circle in hell for those who 'believe' in Him for the cynically 
selfish purpose of getting into heaven."73 
Although there is some force to these arguments, Pascal's wager 
can be viewed in a more charitable light. To understand how, it is use-
ful to contrast Pascal with his contemporary, Rene Descartes. Accord-
ing to one modern philosopher, "[the wager's] drama is played out on 
the stage of Cartesian skepticism."74 Like Descartes, Pascal started by 
emphasizing the position of the subject. The primary question is not 
69 This is the "free translation" of William James, which clarifies the passage nicely. WILLIAM 
]AMES, The Will to Believe, in SELECTED WRITINGS 249, 252 (G.H. Bird ed., r995). Because 
the Pensees is a collection of Pascal's notes, the text is often cryptic. For a more literal transla-
tion, see BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES r22-25 (A.J. Krailsheimer trans., rev. ed. I995) (r67o). 
70 One modern scholar chronicles the condemnation of the argument at a dinner using the 
standard objections. "[T]he mathematics was dismissed as 'punk'; its argument, as fanatical and 
naive; its influence, as weak .... [T]he argument is hypocritical and it is that of a man of no 
faith." George Anastaplo, Law & Literature and the Christian Heritage: Explorations, 40 
BRANDEIS L.]. r92, 37I (2oor). 
71 NICHOLAS RESCHER, PASCAL'S WAGER: A STUDY OF PRACTICAL REASONING IN 
PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY 2 (r985) (quoting TERENCE PENELHUM, GOO AND SCEPTIC-
ISM (r983)). 
72 ]AMES, supra note 6g, at 25 r. 
73 John Hart Ely, Ely's Wager, 5 GREEN BAG 20 393, 395 (2002). 
i4 RESCHER, supra note 7r, at 3· 
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what is the world like, but rather how do we know the world. This 
basic methodological move led both Descartes and Pascal to a philoso-
phical position of radical doubt. Descartes's response to this result 
was epistemic and in some sense Aquinian. He rescued knowledge 
with classical arguments for the existence of God and then extrapo-
lated the possibility of human knowledge as a logical consequence of 
God's nature. 75 
Pascal's response was practical and Augustinian. Unlike Descartes, 
Pascal did not believe that it was possible to construct a "proof" of 
God's existence. 76 However, following Augustine, he was interested in 
justifying faith rather than proving certainty, and accordingly, the ab-
sence of a "proof" in response to skepticism worried him far less than it 
did Descartes. 77 Having in some sense given up on the epistemic en-
terprise, Pascal turned his attention to practical reasoning. In the face 
of doubt, rather than ask about knowledge, Pascal asked about action. 
This pragmatism led Pascal to formulate the wager not as a way of 
convincing the doubter, but as a way of guiding the doubter's choices. 
Pascal thus would have agreed with the claim that we cannot simply 
choose to believe, but would have responded that by engaging in a re-
ligious life we open ourselves to the possibility of faith through divine 
grace78 and sheer force of mental habit. 
The primacy of this pragmatic stance also suggests how one might 
respond to the second criticism. In deciding how to act, Pascal viewed 
actors as irreducibly situated. The practical question is always how 
one should act given one's current knowledge and beliefs. His argu-
ment was not meant to be universally persuasive. Rather, it was 
meant to guide the actions of people who already had a specific set of 
beliefs. Pascal's audience was not the committed skeptic or even the 
disinterested investigator. Rather, it was the lapsed, nominal Christian 
for whom Pascal's God was a real possibility. William James formu-
lated a vocabulary that is helpful here.i 9 According to James, all hy-
potheses are either "live" or "dead" to people.80 This quality does not 
75 See ROBERT C. SOLOMON & KATHLEEN M. HIGGINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF 
PHILOSOPHY r8r-82 (1996) (discussing Descartes's philosophy and the role of God in his episte-
mology). 
76 See RESCHER, supra note 7I, at 4-5 ("[I]n Pascal's opinion [a rational demonstration to 
'prove' to skeptical outsiders that God exists is] a hopeless endeavor - as the skeptics have estab-
lished .... "). 
77 See id. at 4 ("Pascal substitutes an Augustinian concern for the validation of belief in a God 
who is beyond the reach of the unaided human intellect and outside the grasp of feeble human 
reason."). 
78 Cf O'CONNELL, supra note 64, at 91 ("The first stirring ... that God inspires in the soul he 
truly condescends to touch leads to a knowledge .... " (quoting BLAISE PASCAL, ON THE 
CONVERSION OF THE SINNER (r654)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
79 See ]AMES, supra note 69, at 249. 
so /d. at 250. 
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refer to anything intrinsic in a hypothesis; it refers to whatever it is in 
the background of those considering the hypothesis that lets them con-
sider it as a real intellectual possibility.81 James wrote: 
A live hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to 
whom it is proposed. If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion 
makes no electric connection with your nature - it refuses to scintillate 
with any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it is completely dead. To an 
Arab, however (even if he be not one of the Mahdi 's followers), the hy-
pothesis is among the mind's possibilities: it is alive. This shows that 
deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but re-
lations to the individual thinker. They are measured by his willingness to 
act.82 
Employing this vocabulary, Pascal's wager is only meant to appeal to 
those for whom Pascal's God is a "live hypothesis." 
B. The State's Wager 
The practical structure of Pascal's wager has attracted legal theo-
rists in the past,83 but no one has explicitly applied its probabilistic 
reasoning to the problem of valuing religious truth claims. As one 
scholar has noted, "[Pascal's] wager nicely illustrates a significant 
problem in philosophy: because reason cannot determine the authentic-
ity of religious truths, the philosopher confronting religion must deal 
with important choices in the context of profound uncertainty."84 
However, such uncertainty does not mean that the state should treat 
religious truth claims as valueless. Rather, it suggests that religious 
freedom can be justified as a wager by the state in the face of the pos-
sibility of religious truth. 
In his passage on the wager in the Pensees, Pascal responds to one 
obvious criticism of the hypothetical choice that he sets up for his reli-
gious agnostic: why not simply refuse to choose to believe in God or 
not to believe in him? This criticism speaks to precisely the kind of 
pragmatic issue that Pascal seeks to address. In the face of uncer-
tainty, it would seem that the best course would be to take no action at 
all. An agnostic following this argument would not condemn a be-
81 See id. 
82 ld. 
83 See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitu-
tional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 347 (1995). In justifying the place of religion in America's consti-
tutional structure, Eisgruber draws an analogy to the wager argument. According to Eisgruber, 
the Constitution instantiates "Madison's Wager," a system of complex institutional arrangements 
that "restrict the role of religious argument in public affairs, but the restriction operates largely 
through self-executing structural mechanisms independent of judicial doctrine." !d. at 350. Eis-
gruber's concerns are therefore peripheral to the rawer question discussed by this Note, but his 
article does illustrate the usefulness of using Pascal's wager as a prism for dealing with the issue 
of how the government should act in the face of uncertainty about religious truth claims. 
84 I d. at 349· 
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liever for believing falsely, but rather for acting precipitately on the ba-
sis of imperfect information: "I will condemn them not for having 
made this particular choice, but any choice, for, although the one who 
calls heads and the other one are equally at fault, the fact is that they 
are both at fault: the right thing is not to wager at all."85 Pascal's re-
sponse is to deny the possibility of this unengaged stance: "Yes, but 
you must wager .... [Y]ou are already committed."86 To refrain from 
wagering is- for all practical purposes- to wager against God's ex-
istence. The choice not to act is "none the less a choice. "87 
In the face of religiously motivated behavior that violates the law 
- or violates a proposed law - the state encounters an analogous 
situation. It cannot avoid the "raw question" posed at the outset of 
this Note. The state must choose- through courts or through legisla-
tures - either to refrain from sanctioning religious conduct or to pun-
ish it. The reason is simple: inaction in such a case is "none the less a 
choice."88 Allowing the law to go forward and punish religious behav-
ior is not neutral. Nor is the decision to exempt religious practice. 
The state cannot retreat from the issue. 
All religions claim to offer their adherents something of ultimate 
value - salvation, nirvana, entrance to paradise, righteousness before 
God. William James argued that religion is, among other things, the 
belief "[t]hat the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from 
which it draws its chief significance; ... [and] [t]hat union or harmoni-
ous relation with that higher universe is our true end. "89 The historian 
of religion Mircea Eliade identified religion with the cosmic orientation 
of the believer, an orientation that lets the believer participate in the 
transcendent order of the universe: 
[R]eligious man lives in an open world and ... his existence is open to the 
world. This means that religious man is accessible to an infinite series of 
experiences that could be termed cosmic. Such experiences are always re-
ligious, for the world is sacred . 
. . . In other words, "he who knows" has at command an entirely dif-
ferent experience from that of the profane man.90 
85 PASCAL, supra note 69, at 122-23. 
86 /d. at 123. The insight here is similar to the state action paradoxes of constitutional law. 
See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEM-
PORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 49-71 (1996). 
87 Cf Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (holding that a decision by a state not to act 
is nevertheless a choice). 
88 /d. 
89 WILLIAM ]AMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN 
NATURE 475 (Modern Library 1936) (1902). 
90 MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION 169-
71 (William R. Trask trans., Harcourt Brace & Co. 1959) (1957). 
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In short, religion understands itself as the "ultimate concern."91 
For religious believers, the good offered by religion is both real and 
substantial. Indeed, the long history of believers willing to sacrifice 
life, liberty, and property for their faith demonstrates that people place 
value on these ultimate goods that is every bit as concrete as the value 
they place on more commonplace goods protected by the law. Yet, de-
spite religion's cosmic, spiritual, intellectual, and practical significance, 
the modern state cannot seem to take account of religion's understand-
ing of its own importance. 
Pascal's wager seems to provide a way for the state to appreciate 
this religious self-understanding without creating the kind of official 
theology that is anathema to modern liberal democracy. The wager 
offers a way of making a decision that does not require the state to 
take a position on the underlying truth of the options at stake. The 
skeptic in Pascal's wager does not know whether God exists. Like-
wise, a liberal state cannot take a position on the truth or falsity of re-
ligious claims. However, the forced question of religious liberty means 
that the state cannot simply ignore those claims without treating them 
de facto as false. To punish a member of the Native American Church 
like any other drug user for taking her sacrament is to treat the tran-
scendent promises of that sacrament as meaningless and valueless. 
Legal theorists have long debated the purpose of government regu-
lation. One prominent theory is that government should regulate in-
teractions between citizens to eliminate inefficiency. The lynchpin of 
much of this reasoning is the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.92 
Briefly stated, an activity is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if those who benefit 
from the activity could fully compensate all those who are harmed 
from the activity and still reap benefits. 93 For example, suppose that a 
soda pop manufacturer currently uses cans to package its soda but 
wishes to shift to bottles, which would be three cents cheaper per unit. 
However, the shift to bottles would cause one accident per Ioo,ooo 
bottles with a cost of $10,ooo. The shift from cans to bottles is ineffi-
91 Cf PAUL TILLICH, Our Ultimate Concern, in THE ESSENTIAL TILLICH 32-38 (F. Forres-
ter Church ed., 1987). 
92 For example, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the concept that structures the thought of many law 
and economics scholars, including Richard Posner. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW l4 (5th ed. 1998). 
93 One pair of legal philosophers offers the following more formalized definition: 
S, is Kaldor-Hicks efficient to S if and only if in going from S to S, the winners could 
compensate the losers so that no one would be worse than he or she was in S and at least 
one person would be better off than he or she was in S. 
}EFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 186 (rev. ed. 1990). Note, 
however, that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not require that the losers actually be compensated. 
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cient.94 This notion of efficiency suggests two possible policy prescrip-
tions. First, the state may simply forbid inefficient transactions. Sec-
ond, the state may adopt mechanisms that require actors to internalize 
fully the costs of their actions to others. This, in turn, will create pow-
erful disincentives to engage in inefficient behavior.95 
The wager provides an officially agnostic state with a way of con-
sidering religion's self-assessment of its value in the state's efficiency 
calculus. It accomplishes this by reasoning probabilistically. The 
heart of Pascal's argument is that, in the presence of uncertainty about 
God's existence, the expected value of wagering on God nevertheless 
exceeds the value of wagering against him.96 A state interested in effi-
cient regulation has a similar interest in the expected value of particu-
lar options. A truly agnostic state, like Pascal's wagerer, must consider 
religion as a "live" hypothesis. It must entertain that religion could be 
either true or false. From the point of view of religion, religious be-
havior can have huge - even infinite - value. In the presence of un-
certainty about theological truth claims, the state can, like the wagerer 
in Pascal's argument, nevertheless consider that value by discounting 
it by its uncertainty. In other words, the expected value of religious 
behavior, even from the state's agnostic point of view, is neverthel~ss 
very, very great. It is easy, but mistaken, to psychologize this argu-
ment. One might characterize the harm suffered by the believer as 
some negative psychological reaction to state coercion.97 This is not 
94 The increased profits to the bottler per roo,ooo = $.03 x roo,ooo = $3,000. The accident 
costs per roo,ooo = $ro,ooo. This example is adapted from A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 97-98 (2d ed. 1989). 
95 See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 62 (6th ed. 1995). 
96 The wager can be formalized to illustrate this point. While not capturing all of the subtle-
ties of the issue, formalization can usefully illustrate the relationships among the different vari-
ables. The choice of the wager can be reduced to: 
Options 
Bet on God 
Do not bet on God 
Returns to Chooser 
If God exists 
(probability p) 
X 
0 
If God doesn't exist 
(probability r - p) 
-Y 
0 
In addition, there is a fixed cost B to betting on God (effort of going to mass, the foregone 
pleasures of riotous dissipation, and so on), which must be considered. Thus, the expected value 
of betting on God is: 
EV(bet on God)= p(X) + (r-p)(-Y) - B = p(X+Y)- Y- B 
For Pascal's audience, the value of X is effectively infinite (eternal bliss) and the value of Y is zero 
(Pascal and his audience assume that no one is punished in the eternities for wagering wrong). 
Thus, so long as p exceeds zero, the expected value of betting on God exceeds the expected value 
of not wagering. See RESCHER, supra note 71, at I2j see also RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOM-
ING LAW 502 (1995) (formalizing Pascal's wager slightly differently). 
97 See, e.g., John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7]. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 275, 283-88 (1996) (arguing that burdening religious belief gives rise to especially 
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the argument this Note advances. The potential value of protecting 
the confessional is not that it will confer some psychological benefit on 
a Catholic believer. Rather, the potential value is that the confessional 
will actually cleanse the believer of sin and give her access to Paradise. 
Likewise, the potential wrong of burdening the confessional is not 
some psychological damage. It is the danger of hellfire and damna-
tion. 
Still, acknowledging that an agnostic state must ascribe great value 
to the possibility of the ultimate concerns of religion does not mean 
that the state should never regulate religious activity. After all, even if 
the expected value of religious activity is very high, it is nevertheless 
true that religious behavior can impose costs on others. For example, 
during the nineteenth century, proponents of anti-polygamy legislation 
aimed at Mormons argued that their religiously inspired polygamy 
caused grave harms to other members of society.98 Likewise, propo-
nents of regulating peyote may point to the costs - crime, medical 
problems, social ills associated with addiction, and so forth - of drug 
use. The question is how the state should respond to these external-
ities in its regulation of religion. First, an efficient state would not 
want to prohibit religious activity altogether, even if it created some 
finite level of costs for others. Those made better off by the regulation 
- in finite terms - would not be able to compensate the potentially 
infinite loss suffered by believers. For example, if the state takes seri-
ously the possibility that taking peyote provides the transcendent 
promises of a sacrament, the gain in terms of avoided costs that would 
come from prohibition would be exceeded by the expected value of al-
lowing members of the Native American Church to take peyote.99 Put 
another way, religious freedom would be efficient. 
grievous psychological harms). Professor Gedicks labels such alleged psychological results 
"Transcendent Consequences." Gedicks, supra note 58, at 562. However, these purely subjective 
effects are not what this Note refers to·as "ultimate concerns." 
98 GORDON, supra note 21, at 29-54 (discussing the costs that nineteenth-century anti-
polygamists claimed that Mormon plural marriage imposed on society). 
99 Like Pascal's wager, this result may be usefully formalized to illustrate the structure of the 
argument. The expected value in the view of the agnostic state of forbidding peyote would be: 
E V(peyote prohibition) = C - pX 
where C represents the costs imposed by smoking peyote, X is the value of smoking peyote as de-
fined within the horizon of religious belief, and p is the probability that the truth claims of the 
religion are true from within the horizon of the agnostic state. So long as X is functionally infinite 
compared to C, and the value of p exceeds zero (in other words, the state is willing to posit that 
the religious truth claims might be true), the expected value of prohibiting religiously inspired pe-
yote use would be less than zero. If the state is interested in prohibiting only inefficient activities, 
then it will not prohibit behavior unless those made better off by the prohibition would be better 
off even after fully compensating those burdened by it. Put another way, it will not regulate 
unless the expected value of the regulation is positive. 
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This does not mean, however, that it is never efficient for the state 
to regulate activity that might in some cases be religiously motivated. 
For example, if religiously inspired polygamy promised to nineteenth-
century Mormons the possibility of infinite eternal rewards, an out-
right prohibition of religious polygamy would not be efficient. How-
ever, Mormons did not claim that nonreligiously motivated polygamy 
promised the same eternal rewards, and in fact nineteenth-century 
Mormon defenders of polygamy argued that garden-variety bigamy 
should be forbidden because of the harm that it caused. 100 If the nega-
tive externalities of such nonreligious bigamy were greater than the 
(now nonreligious) benefit gained by the bigamist, a prohibition would 
be efficient. Thus, a regime that forbade certain cost-creating behav-
ior while exempting behavior that was religiously motivated but oth-
erwise similar could be justified on the basis of the state's agnosticism 
and the goal of efficiency. 
Even if it is not efficient to prohibit religious behavior, the state 
may nevertheless want to force religious actors to internalize the costs 
they impose on others. There are two reasons for this. First, the state 
may want to use this cost internalization to generate revenue to com-
pensate those harmed by religious activity. Thus, for example, the 
state might tax peyote use to finance community redevelopment in pe-
yote-ravaged neighborhoods. Alternatively, it might give those harmed 
by Mormon polygamy a civil cause of action against religious polyga-
mists. Second, the state may be uncertain about the precise value that 
a religion ascribes to any given behavior. If religious actors must fully 
internalize the negative externalities they create, however, the state 
avoids having to make close calls. For example, if the state knows that 
wine imbibed during mass leads a certain number of people into alco-
holism that imposes costs on others, it may impose a tax on the saying 
of mass equal to those costs. This would allow Catholics to assess the 
value of the mass against the burden of the tax. If they ascribe suffi-
cient theological value to the mass, they will continue to celebrate the 
sacraments despite the tax. However, if the rituals are theologically 
peripheral and of lesser value, then they will be dropped when their 
cost exceeds their expected benefit. Thus, the state can effectively for-
bid inefficient behavior even when it is uncertain about precise theo-
logical calibrations. 
Ultimately, the argument from Pascal's wager inverts the argument 
against religious compulsion first articulated by John Locke. For 
Locke, compulsory religion lacked value because it could not lead to 
100 See GEORGE Q. CANNON, A REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES, IN THE CASE OF GEO. REYNOLDS VS. THE UNITED STATES 29 (1879) 
(arguing that "a wide distinction exists between the crime of bigamy or polygamy [as defined by 
the common law] ... and the ... (polygamous] marriage of the Latter-day Saints"). 
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genuine religious faith. 101 The argument from Pascal's wager asserts 
that protecting voluntary religious activity is valuable precisely be-
cause it might - literally- lead to the "Salvation of Souls." As one 
modern scholar has written: 
[R]eligious claims - if true - are prior to and of greater dignity than the 
claims of the state. If there is a God, His authority necessarily transcends 
the authority of nations; that, in part, is what we mean by "God." For the 
state to maintain that its authority is in all matters supreme would be to 
deny the possibility that a transcendent authority could exist. Religious 
claims thus differ from secular moral claims both because the state is con-
stitutionally disabled from disputing the truth of the religious claim and 
because it cannot categorically deny the authority on which such a claim 
rests.ro2 
III. THE PROBLEM OF HELL 
The "problem of hell"103 presents the most difficult challenge to the 
wager. This problem resembles one of the two classic objections to 
Pascal's wager: "God might be unimpressed by so opportunistic a wor-
shipper, and a choice of the wrong sect might be as fatal as remaining 
an agnostic .... "104 An analogous problem presents itself in the wager 
on religious freedom. If the agnostic state is willing to acknowledge 
that it is possible that religious claims are true, and that the promised 
ultimate benefits may in fact materialize, it would also seem that the 
state should consider the possibility that these claims are mistaken. If 
the state protects religious rituals because they may in fact get people 
into heaven, should it not also entertain the possibility that allowing 
people to perform the incorrect religious rituals may speed their souls 
to hell? After all, the bedrock premise of the wager is that the state 
must not only refrain from endorsing any particular religious position, 
but must also refrain from treating any religious position as false; in 
short, the state must take all religious claims seriously. If the state 
considers both sides of the issue, is the wager on religious freedom still 
efficient? 
101 Locke wrote: 
Neither the Profession of any Articles of Faith, nor the Conformity to any outward Form 
of Worship ... can be available to the Salvation of Souls, unless the truth of the one, 
and the acceptableness of the other unto God, be thoroughly believed .... But Penalties 
are no ways capable to produce such Belief. 
LOCKE, supra note 12, at 27. 
102 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15. 
!03 Although the idea of "hell" and the examples employed in this section are drawn from 
Christian theology, the "problem of hell" is not uniquely Christian. Rather, it is concerned with 
how the state should respond to mutually exclusive theological characterizations of the same ac-
tivity. 
104 POSNER, supra note 96, at 502. 
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For example, Catholics may believe that the sacraments increase 
their chances of eternal rewards, 105 but certain anti-Catholic Protes-
tants may believe with equal fervor that such rituals will send practi-
tioners to hell. 106 If the state treats both claims as equally probable, 
then it is not at all clear that the wager on religious freedom remains 
efficient. Suppose that there are significant secular social costs to cele-
brating the mass. (Perhaps the wine increases drunkenness, leading to 
child abuse.) If one considers both the possibility that the mass may 
send one to heaven and the possibility that it may send one to hell, 
then the value of "ultimate concerns" may net out to zero, and an out-
right prohibition might be efficient because of the nonreligious social 
costs of the mass. 107 
One possible response is to invoke some antipaternalist principle 
with regard to religion. The argument would be that the state should 
not meddle in personal religious choices. Those favoring more robust 
protection for religious freedom have repeatedly advanced this argu-
ment. Indeed, some have gone so far as to define the concept of reli-
gious freedom as the claim that religious choices should be kept purely 
private, without any nudging one way or another from the state. For 
example, law and economics scholars have argued that the state should 
employ an economic model of neutrality to ensure that religion is nei-
ther subsidized nor taxed, thus ensuring that religious choices are truly 
personal. 108 Others have made similar arguments in noneconomic 
terms. 109 They have argued that a merely formal neutrality actually 
creates disincentives for certain kinds of religious practice, and that 
what is required is a substantive notion of equality that makes the 
state genuinely neutral in the religious calculus of its citizens. 110 But 
the problem with using these arguments to save the wager argument 
105 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOl.TC CHURCH 293 (1994) ("The sacraments are efficacious 
signs of grace, instituted by Christ and entrusted to the Church by which divine life is dispersed 
to us."). 
106 See, e.g., Dave Hunt, A Cult is a Cult, THE BEREAN CALL, Dec. 1998, at http://www. 
thebereancall.org/articles/newpage3s.htm ("The deviation by Catholicism from biblical Christian-
ity goes to the heart of the faith, to salvation itself, and thus affects the eternal destiny of those 
deceived thereby."). 
107 The issue can be formalized as: 
E V(wagering on freedom) = pX- p Y- B 
where p is the probability that the religious claims are true, X is the ultimate value promised by 
the first theology (heaven), Y is the cost promised by the second theology (hell), and B is the cost 
of forgoing regulation (the temporal costs imposed on others by the religious behavior). If X and 
Y are of equal value, then the expected value of the wager on religious freedom becomes negative 
because of B. 
108 See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Reli-
gious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. r, 4-14 (1989). 
109 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Re-
ligion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990). 
110 /d. at IOOI-o6. 
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for religious ·liberty is that they are ultimately inconsistent with it. The 
wager does not seek to privatize religion. On the contrary, it rests on 
the idea that the state can take religion seriously when trying to regu-
late efficiently. In short, it relies on the possibility of considering the 
value of religion as religion without taking positions for or against 
claims of religious truth. 
A second, more promising, response rests on the idea of compara-
tive competence. Recall that when the state considers the "problem of 
hell," it nets together both the value of heaven and the cost of hell dis-
counted by the probability of religious truth. In order for "ultimate 
concerns" to cancel each other out, the state must assign the same 
probability to each theology. In other words, the state must think that 
it is equally probable that the mass will send you to heaven or to hell. 
However, there is no reason that this should be the case. Seen in these 
terms, the "problem of hell" asks the state to judge the comparative 
probabilities of various theologies. 111 
At this point, it is tempting to throw up one's hands and say with 
Pascal's skeptic, "the right thing is not to wager at all."112 However, 
the state cannot retreat from the choice: choosing not to wager on reli-
gious freedom is not neutral. In the case of the mass hypothetical, it is 
the functional equivalent of assuming that, on the whole, the mass is 
just as likely to send people to heaven as to hell. 113 Not choosing is 
thus a choice. If the urge to throw up one's hands stems from genuine 
uncertainty, simply not wagering is the wrong choice to make. 
Assuming that the state takes religion seriously but cannot judge 
the relative probabilities of religion, the state should want the decision 
whether to engage in religious activity to be made by the actor with 
the best information about the matter. However, for precisely the rea-
sons that lead the state to agnosticism, it is not the best actor to make 
these decisions. The state cannot pray, meditate, engage in theological 
dialectic, or head down any of the other myriad paths to religious truth 
Ill Suppose that the expected value of wagering on religious freedom is: 
E V(freedom) = pX- p Y- B 
This statement assumes that the theologies of X and Y are equally plausible. The expected 
value of wagering on religious freedom could thus be given a more nuanced statement by relaxing 
this assumption: 
EV(freedom) = P.X- P,Y- B 
where P. and P, represent the probability that theologies X and Y respectively are true. If we as-
sume that X and Y have comparable values, then it follows that the wager on religious freedom 
will be the efficient choice if P. exceeds P, by a sufficiently large margin. The central question is 
thus what values the state assigns toP. and P,. 
112 PASCAL, supra note 69, at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
113 Note, however, that it is not the functional equivalent of treating P. as less than p,. Such a 
belief would lead to the conclusion that religiously motivated behavior should be prohibited (or at 
least more severely regulated), since it is more likely to send people to hell than to send them to 
heaven. 
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- including the path that may lead to justified atheism. These are 
things that only actual people can do. In wagering on religious free-
dom, the state functionally treats the probability that freedom will 
send people to heaven as greater than the probability that it will send 
them to hell. This may or may not be the correct position to take; 
however, in so doing the state throws the risk of damnation back onto 
its citizens. 
In a sense, religious freedom becomes a regime of soteriological 
strict liability. Proponents of strict liability argue that transferring the 
potential cost of damage onto the party that undertakes a risky activ-
ity is justified because, among other things, that party is likely to have 
the best information about how to prevent accidents. 114 Likewise, al-
lowing religious believers to engage in religiously motivated conduct 
places the religious risk of that conduct on their shoulders. Such risk 
shifting is justified because these people are likely to be in a better 
epistemological position than the state. In fact, the state's decision to 
wager on religious freedom may even create incentives for religious be-
lievers to act more carefully, because the state will not intervene to 
keep them from going to hell. 11 5 
CONCLUSION 
There are limitations to the wager argument for religious freedom. 
It is ultimately a pragmatic and loosely utilitarian argument rather 
than a deontological one. Efficiency is hardly a universally accepted 
criterion. 116 Thus, the wager is unlikely to appeal to those who want 
all "rights" to be defended in terms of the Kantian commands of indi-
vidualism.117 However, the wager is not necessarily inconsistent with 
such arguments, and there is no reason that it could not be one among 
several arguments in favor of religious freedom. Given the criterion of 
efficiency, the wager argument provides a possible guide for state ac-
tion in the face of religious uncertainty. Given this limitation to its 
appeal, the wager is unlikely to solve the malaise in the current theo-
retical discussion of religious freedom. The advantage, however, is 
that the wager argument seeks to respond to the fundamental problem 
114 See EPSTEIN, supra note 95, at 157. 
115 In addition to deontological justifications for individual choice and Locke's argument about 
the impossibility of coercing belief, this argument from comparative epistemological advantage 
explains why an agnostic state that takes religion seriously would refrain from using coercion to 
require its citizens to adopt a particular religion. In choosing from a menu of pro-coercion or 
anti-coercion theologies and policies, the state would have to make a decision about the compara-
tive probability of religious truth. 
116 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 
8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980) (criticizing the concept of efficiency). 
117 Cf }OHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4 (rev. ed. 1999) ("[T]he rights secured by jus-
tice are not subject to ... the calculus of social benefits."). 
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with the current justifications for religious freedom: the loss of the 
ability to take account of religion's own understanding of its value. If 
the wager argument has a virtue, it is that it seeks to find a way of 
weighing this value without creating an official theology. To the extent 
that the state is still willing to take religion seriously, the wager argu-
ment has some bite. If, however, as some critics have claimed, the 
modern liberal state at bottom treats religion as a false or merely psy-
chological phenomenon, then the wager is unlikely to do anything to 
appeal to "the actual feelings ... of the community."118 
118 HOLMES, supra note I, at 36. 
